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Effective Tax Rates under IP Tax Planning 
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Abstract: Tax planning with intangibles has become one of the most popular and most vividly 
debated topics in international taxation. We incorporate various intellectual property (IP) tax 
planning models into forward-looking measures of effective tax rates, namely the disposal of 
intangibles to low-tax subsidiaries, intra-group licensing arrangements, and intra-group 
contract R&D. In doing so, we draw upon the methodology put forward by Devereux and Griffith 
and amend this model by considering a research & development (R&D) investment which is 
carried out by a parent company, whereby the resulting intangible is exploited by a foreign 
subsidiary. We point out analytically under which conditions IP tax planning achieves the 
objective of reducing the effective average tax rate of the group. We find that the disposal of 
intangibles to low-tax subsidiaries does not achieve this tax planning objective, if the true 
value of the asset is subject to tax upon the disposal. We show to what extent the parent must 
understate the value of the intangible in order to reduce the group’s tax burden. We 
furthermore point out that contract R&D may generally achieve a significant lower effective tax 
burden. We present cost of capital and effect average tax rates to illustrate these findings.  
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1 Introduction 
Intangible assets constitute a major value-driver for multinational companies. 
The related intellectual property (IP), most notably patents, trademarks, and 
copyrights, usually does not have a fixed geographical nexus and can be 
relocated without significant (non-tax) costs. By allocating valuable IP to group 
companies resident in low-tax countries multinational companies can use this 
flexibility to reduce their overall tax burden.1 Indeed, recent empirical evidence 
indicates that patent applications are responsive to corporation tax2 and that 
intangible assets are more likely to be held by low-taxed subsidiaries.3  
Tax planning involving intangible assets has become increasingly popular and 
recently received widespread attention, as it has been associated with strikingly 
low effective tax rates on foreign profits of high-tech multinationals such as 
Google and Apple.4 For example by way of allocating valuable intangible assets 
to an intra-group IP holding company resident in a low-tax country, which 
subsequently licenses out these intangible to operating group companies, 
profits may be shifted from high-tax to low-tax countries. Within the European 
Union (EU), the Interest & Royalties Directive ensures that such intra-group 
royalty payments are not subject to any additional source country withholding 
tax in case certain participation requirements are met. Transfer pricing rules aim 
to ensure that the transfer of valuable intangible assets triggers taxation. It is, 
however, difficult to determine the ‘true value’ of intangibles for transfer pricing 
purposes as they are rarely traded on external markets due to their uniqueness 
and their central role in the generation of excess profits. 
As an alternative to the disposal of IP, IP may be allocated to IP holding 
companies by way of (intra-group) contract R&D. This involves that an IP holding 
                                                 
1  See Darby and Lernaster (2007), Fuest et al. (2013), p. 308, Kang and Ngo (2012), Verlinden 
and Smits (2009). 
2  See Griffith et. al. (2014), Karkinsky and Riedel (2012). 
3  See Dischinger and Riedel (2011).  
4  See Sullivan (2012), p. 655. 
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company commissions another group entity to perform R&D activity. As a 
consequence, the commissioning party obtains the legal ownership and 
reimburses the R&D company through a contract R&D fee which is usually 
determined on a cost-plus basis.5 The IP holding company then licenses out the 
IP to operating group companies. 
The above sketched-out IP tax planning models allow for locating the R&D 
activity and the income flows from the commercialisation of the resulting 
intangible assets in different jurisdictions. This way, multinational companies 
can make use of an attractive research infrastructure and generous R&D tax 
incentives in one country and benefit in another from low tax rates on the 
income from exploiting intangible assets.  
The contribution of this paper is to analyse popular IP tax planning models 
drawing on effective tax rates. For this purpose, we incorporate IP tax planning 
models into forward-looking measures of the cost of capital and the effective 
average tax rate (EATR). In doing so, we build upon the methodology of Devereux 
and Griffith6 but focus on investments in self-developed intangible assets. By 
extending the analytical tools available for determining effective tax burdens to 
incorporate cross-border IP tax planning,7 we pursue the following objectives.  
Our first aim is to point out the effect of IP tax planning models on the effective 
tax burden. Disregarding tax planning opportunities when determining effective 
rates may overstate the effective tax burden of multinational companies. 
Strikingly low effective tax rates reported on the balance sheets of certain 
multinational companies such as Apple, Google, and Cisco point to this.8 
Furthermore we compare the effective tax burdens of cross-border investments 
involving tax planning with the effective tax burdens of a purely domestic 
                                                 
5  See OECD (2010), para 7.41, Russo (2007), p. 172. 
6  See Devereux and Griffith (1999, 2003). 
7  The OECD also proposes a model for determining effective tax rates that incorporates cross-
border tax planning. In some respects (e.g. the calculation of the EATR), this model differs 
from the Devereux and Griffith model (see OECD (2013a), pp. 135 et seq.). 
8  See Sullivan (2012), p. 655.  
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investments. That way, competitive advantages of multinationals associated 
with tax planning opportunities become evident.  
Second, our interest is to point out which features of the tax system drive the 
effective tax burden when companies may make use of IP tax planning. In 
particular, we highlight under which conditions the IP tax planning models are 
associated with a tax advantage compared to domestic investment. This also 
provides some orientation on which features of tax systems are most relevant 
when it comes to reducing the tax planning leeway of multinational companies. 
Third, by drawing on effective tax measures, we aim towards highlighting and 
analysing potential incentive effects of taxes on investment decisions, such as 
where to create and exploit intangible assets, in case multinational companies 
face IP tax planning opportunities.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 briefly introduces 
the Devereux & Griffith model. In section 3, we adapt this model to incorporate 
popular IP tax planning models and provide an analytical analysis of the effects 
of these models on the effective tax burden. In section 4 we present cost of 
capital and effective average tax rates to illustrate the findings of section 3. 
Section 5 finally summarises the main findings.  
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2 The Devereux & Griffith model for calculating effective tax rates 
We apply the methodology put forward by Devereux and Griffith9 when modelling 
the impact of IP Boxes on the effective tax burden. This model is based on the 
assumption that companies invest in capital as long as the (decreasing) 
marginal returns cover the marginal costs, the cost of capital. The cost of capital 
is the minimum required pre-tax real rate of return on the investment, given a 
post-tax real rate of return of an alternative investment on the capital market 
required by the investor (‘financial investment’ in what follows). In line with 
neoclassical investment theory, this approach rests on the assumption of a 
perfect capital market under certainty and that the real investment is successful. 
The cost of capital is used to analyse the effects of tax on marginal investment 
decisions, and therefore on the scale of investment. In turn, the effective 
average tax rate (EATR) demonstrates the effects of tax on a profitable 
investment project. The EATR is calculated as the percentage difference in the 
net present value (NPV) of an investment in both the absence and presence of 
tax. This measure is therefore relevant for exploring how tax affects companies’ 
choices between different profitable investment opportunities. Discreteness of 
investment decisions can arise for example when investment funds are limited, 
so that not all profitable investments can be carried out. Deciding in which 
country to carry out a profitable investment project i.a. constitutes a discrete 
investment decision. A comparison of the EATR therefore allows for assessing 
the attractiveness of countries in terms of a location for investment in R&D 
giving rise to intangible assets and in terms of a location for the exploitation of 
such assets.  
The model refers to a hypothetical investment that takes place in one period and 
generates a return in the next period. The standard case of the Devereux & 
Griffith Model refers to an investment project comprising five different kinds of 
assets. These are machinery, industrial buildings, inventory, financial assets, 
                                                 
9  See Devereux and Griffith (1999, 2003). They build on the work of Jorgenson (1963), Hall 
and Jorgensen (1967) and King and Fullerton (1984). 
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and acquired patents.10 Here, we focus on an R&D investment giving rise to a 
self-developed patent thereby only considering one asset. In doing so, we 
assume that R&D investment expenditures fully constitute current R&D expenses 
such as labour expenses for R&D personnel. This simplifying assumption reflects 
the fact that by far the biggest share of R&D expenditures generally constitutes 
current expenses.11 
Equation (1) represents the after-tax NPV of the R&D investment giving rise to a 
patent financed with equity. In line with previous literature, the R&D investment 
is modelled based on the decisive assumption that the R&D expenditures’ value 
is not realised immediately but accrues over several periods.12 The tax treatment 
generally deviates from this: in most EU countries, current R&D expenses are 
immediately deductible from the tax base and generally do not have to be 
capitalised for tax purposes when giving rise to an intangible asset.13  
In what follows, we take the perspective of a large multinational company which 
raises investment funds on the international capital market. Therefore the 
taxation of the individual investors is disregarded in what follows.14 In addition, 
we assume that the investment is financed by means of equity. 
ܴ ൌ െሺ1 െ ܣሻᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
௧௘௥௠	ଵ
൅ ሺ௣ାఋሻሺଵାగሻଵା௜ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
௧௘௥௠	ଶ
൅ ሺଵିఋሻሺଵାగሻଵା௜ ሺ1 െ ܣሻᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
௧௘௥௠	ଷ
       (1) 
                                                 
10  For a more detailed discussion of the model, see Devereux and Griffith (1999, 2003), 
Schreiber et al. (2002), Spengel (2003), pp. 68 et seq. 
11  See Cameron (1996), Dougherty et al. (2007), OECD (2012a). 
12  See Hall and van Reenen (2000), p. 451, McKenzie (2008). 
13  Only Cyprus, Estonia, Portugal, Slovenia and Sweden stipulate the capitalisation of self-
developed patents and certain other intangible assets provided certain recognition 
conditions are fulfilled. In Estonia, profit determination under the distribution tax follows 
IAS 38 of the International Financial Reporting Standards which stipulates the capitalisation 
of self-developed intangible assets if certain requirements are fulfilled. For an overview of 
the treatment of R&D expenses and capitalisation of self-developed intangible assets see 
Endres et al. (eds.) (2007), pp. 36 et seq., Spengel and Zöllkau (2012), pp. 57 et seq., 65.  
14  In this case, it is reasonable to assume that due to the lack of information concerning the 
tax treatment of the marginal shareholder the taxation at the shareholder level is not taken 
into account for investment decisions. 
Evers and Spengel (2014)  Effective Tax Rates under IP Tax Planning 
 
6 
 
Profit taxes, most notably corporate income taxes, affect the NPV of the R&D 
investment in two ways. First, the tax allowance granted for R&D expenses acts 
as a tax shield which shields part of the investment return from taxation. This is 
because most countries allow current R&D expenses incurred in the creation of a 
self-developed intangible asset to be expensed immediately when they are 
incurred. This reduces the investment outlay in period 1 (first term of equation 
(1)).  
ܣ ൌ			 ߮଴ต߬
ூ௠௠௘ௗ௜௔௧௘	ௗ௘ௗ௨௖௧௜௢௡
െ		 	߮଴ถ߬
஼௔௣௜௧௔௟௜௦௔௧௜௢௡
൅ ߮߬ሼ ଵଵା௜
ଵ ൅ ⋯൅ ଵଵା௜
௨௟ሽᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
୔ୣ୰୧୭ୢ୧ୡୟ୪	ୢୣ୮୰ୣୡ୧ୟ୲୧୭୬
       (2) 
Equation (2) denotes the NPV of tax allowances in case of capitalisation of the 
self-developed patent. The second term of equation (2) depicts the 
capitalisation of the patent if this is stipulated by the tax code. Among the EU 
member states this is rarely the case.15 This compensates for the immediate 
deduction of the R&D expenditures depicted by the first term of equation (2) 
(variable ߮଴ reflects the share of R&D expenditures which may be immediately 
deducted, usually 100%). Please note that we make the simplifying assumption 
that the immediate deduction and subsequent capitalisation occur in the same 
period.16 Hence, the first two terms of equation (2) cancel each other. The third 
term accounts for the subsequent depreciation of the patent (applying the 
straight-line depreciation method). Variable ߮ represents the depreciation rate 
and ݑ݈ denotes the useful life of the asset. Variable i depicts the nominal capital 
market interest rate.  
                                                 
15  See footnote 13. 
16  As a consequence, there are no timing effects resulting from the fact that R&D expenses 
remain deductible until a self-developed intangible asset is created. Within this two-period 
framework, the alternative is to assume that capitalisation and exploitation happen in the 
second period. However, this would not lead to significantly different results. Since the 
model considers a perturbation of the capital stock assuming that an investment is 
antedated by one period, the actual length of the R&D investment is irrelevant. 
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If self-developed intangibles do not have to be capitalised, the NPV of the tax 
allowances equals the first term of equation (2). In this case the NPV of the tax 
allowances is equal to the profit tax rate (ܣ ൌ ߬). 
As second tax consequence, the return generated from exploiting the patent 
which accrues in the second period is subject to profit tax at the rate τ (second 
term of equation (1)). This return comprises the real financial return of the 
investment (p) and the one-period cost of depreciation (δ). The variable π 
denotes the inflation rate. The third term of equation (1) finally reflects that the 
model considers a one-period perpetuation of the capital stock instead of a 
permanent capital stock increase.17  
The cost of capital denoted by equation (3) is derived by setting the after-tax 
NPV of the investment (equation (1)) equal to zero, and rearranging the equation 
to isolate the rate of return p.  
݌෤ ൌ ሺଵି஺ሻሺ௜ାఋሺଵାగሻିగሻሺଵାగሻሺଵିఛሻ െ ߜ            (3) 
Another way of expressing the distortions which taxation exerts on investment 
decisions at the margin is the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR). If personal 
taxes are ignored, the EMTR is just a simple monotonous transformation of the 
cost of capital. It represents the tax wedge between the cost of capital and the 
real market interest rate, denoted by ݎ, divided by the cost of capital. Put 
differently, it is the share of the cost of capital which is taxed away. The EMTR is 
illustrated by equation (4). Please note that the real capital market interest rate 
is derived from the nominal capital market interest rate assuming the ‘Fisher 
effect’ which implies the following equation: ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ ∗ ሺ1 ൅ ߨሻ.18 
ܧܯܴܶ ൌ ௣෤ି௥௣෤               (4)	
The EATR is finally defined as the difference between the NPV of the investment 
in the absence of taxes (denoted by ܴ∗ where ܴ∗ ൌ ሺ݌ ൅ ݎሻ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ⁄ ) and in the 
                                                 
17  For a more detailed discussion of the methodology, see Devereux and Griffith (1999, 2003), 
Spengel and Lammersen (2001), and Schreiber et al. (2002). 
18  See Fisher (1930).  
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presence of taxes (ܴ) put in relation to the NPV of the pre-tax total income 
stream net of depreciation (the rate of return). This is depicted by equation (5). 
ܧܣܴܶ ൌ ሺܴ∗ െ ܴሻ/ሺ ௣ሺଵା௥ሻሻ             (5)
Evers and Spengel (2014)  Effective Tax Rates under IP Tax Planning 
 
9 
 
3 Incorporating cross-border IP tax planning into measures of effective 
tax rates 
Here, we further develop the model framework to cover cross-border R&D 
investments where a parent company creates a patent through R&D activity 
which is subsequently exploited by an operative subsidiary resident in another 
jurisdiction. Such a separation of functions may be driven by non-tax factors 
(e.g. location factors) and tax factors (e.g. tax planning opportunities). With 
regard to location factors, such as infrastructure and market access, the ideal 
R&D location might not also be the preferred location for exploiting the created 
intangible asset. When it comes to taxes, different aspects are relevant in order 
to determine the tax efficient location for R&D investment on one hand and the 
exploitation of intangible assets on the other hand. Whereas maximising the 
value of tax deductions for R&D expenses is at the heart of the first decision 
(including making use of input-oriented R&D tax incentives), low profit tax rates 
for income from exploiting intangible assets are pivotal to the second.  
We consider three different IP tax planning models which make use of valuable 
intangible assets and are characterised by locating R&D activity and exploitation 
in different jurisdictions. These include (i) the intra-group disposal of IP from the 
parent to an operating subsidiary, (ii) intra-group licensing, and (iii) intra-group 
contract R&D where the operating subsidiary commissions the parent to perform 
R&D activity on the subsidiary’s risk and account. Figure 1 illustrates the 
structure of the model for calculating effective tax burdens incorporating these 
three IP tax planning models. 
In all of these three IP tax planning models it is the parent company which 
performs the R&D activity and the subsidiary which exploits the patent within 
the scope of its operating activity. However, with respect to the ownership of the 
patent the models differ. The disposal involves that the legal and economic 
ownership is transferred from the parent to the subsidiary. In contrast to this, 
the licensing arrangement involves that the parent retains the legal ownership of 
the patent and that the subsidiary solely obtains a license constituting a right to 
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temporarily exploit the patent. The case is again different under the contract 
R&D arrangement. Assuming that the R&D is carried out on the risk and account 
of the commissioning subsidiary, the subsidiary is considered to be the initial 
legal and economic owner. A transfer of the ownership is therefore not required. 
Figure 1: Structure of the model incorporating IP tax planning  
 
 
In the following, I show how the baseline equation for the NPV of the investment 
depicted by equation (1) in section 2 is amended to consider cross-border R&D 
investment incorporating the considered IP tax planning models. In addition, I 
point out analytically how the IP tax planning models affect the effective tax 
burden. 
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3.1 Disposal of a patent to an operating subsidiary 
3.1.1 Incorporating the disposal in the model 
Equation (6) illustrates the after-tax NPV of an equity-financed R&D investment 
giving rise to a patent, which is subsequently transferred to an operating 
subsidiary. Please note that we assume that dividends are exempt from 
withholding tax at source. This assumption in particular holds true for 
multinational groups of companies resident in the EU where the Parent & 
Subsidiary Directive ensures that dividends are exempt from withholding taxes 
upon meeting certain participation requirements. In addition, we assume that 
dividends are also exempt from corporate income tax in the hands of the parent 
company.19 
ܴ ൌ െሺ1 െ ߮଴߬௉ െ ܣௌ்௉ሻᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
௧௘௥௠	ଵ
െ ߬௉ܶܲᇣᇤᇥ
௧௘௥௠	ଶ
൅ ሺ௣ାఋሻሺଵାగሻଵା௜ ሺ1 െ ߬ௌሻᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
௧௘௥௠	ଷ
൅ ൫ଵିఝబఛುି஺ೄ೅ುାఛು்௉൯ሺଵିఋሻሺଵାగሻଵା௜ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
௧௘௥௠	ସ
   (6) 
The disposal has three tax consequences. First, it triggers taxation of the sales 
price (denoted by TP) paid by the subsidiary on the level of the parent (second 
term of equation (6)). This is referred to as ‘exit taxation’ in what follows. 
Second, the sales price forms the basis for tax depreciation in the source 
country, provided the source country accepts the sales price. This involves a 
‘step-up’ if the sales price exceeds the historical costs of creating the patent 
(depicted by variable ܣௌ்௉ in the first term of equation (6)). Third, the income 
from exploiting the patent is subject to the source country tax rate instead of to 
the residence country tax rate (third term of equation (6).  
We discuss these three elements in detail below. As in the domestic case, the 
last term of equation (6) reflects that the model considers a one-period 
perpetuation of the capital stock instead of a permanent increase of the capital 
stock.  
                                                 
19  With the exception of Ireland, all EU member states exempt foreign dividends in relation to 
substantial participations from corporate income tax (see Spengel et al. (2014), Table A-9, 
p. A-23 et seq.).  
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3.1.1.1 First tax consequence: exit taxation at the level of the parent company 
The disposal triggers taxation of the sales price received by the parent in the 
residence country, denoted by ܶா௫௜௧ (second term of equation (6)). This ‘exit tax’ 
reduces the NPV of the investment project. Assuming that the self-developed 
patent does not have to be capitalised for tax purposes (which is the case in 
most EU countries)20 and therefore has a tax book value of zero, the tax base of 
the exit tax equals the sales price. If the sales price does not fall below the initial 
investment expenditures incurred by the parent, the exit tax exactly offsets the 
original deduction of the R&D investment expenditures (depicted by ߬௣߮଴ in the 
first term of equation (6)). In order to integrate the disposal of the patent in the 
two-period framework of the Devereux & Griffith model, we assume that the 
transfer occurs in the same period as the creation of the asset by way of the R&D 
investment.21 
3.1.1.2 Second tax consequence: step-up at the level of the subsidiary 
Variable ܣௌ்௉ in the first term of equation (6) depicts the second tax consequence 
of the disposal. Provided the subsidiary’s residence country (‘source country’ in 
what follows) accepts the price paid for the patent, this transfer price will form 
the basis for tax depreciation in the source country. This involves that the 
disposal is associated with a ‘step-up’ in the depreciable base in cases where 
the sales price exceeds the R&D investment expenditures. Hence, transferring 
the patent to the subsidiary offers the possibility to deduct more than the 
historical costs from the source country tax base by means of tax depreciation.22 
In case the patent is transferred to a low-tax country, this effect is, however, 
                                                 
20  See footnote 13 in section 2 for details. 
21  See footnote 16 in section 2 for details. 
22  We assume that the parent as well as the subsidiary generate sufficient other income so 
they may immediately fully make use of any tax deductions (i.e. taxpayers are not tax-
exhausted). This assumption is most appropriate in the case of large mature companies 
that generate income from other investment projects. If, in contrast to this, the taxpayer is 
tax-exhausted, the tax benefits associated with tax allowances are delayed. As a 
consequence, the NPV of tax allowances is lower and thereby the effective tax rates are 
higher as in the case of no tax-exhaustion. See Devereux et al. (2002). 
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mitigated by the fact that the tax value of the depreciation allowances is 
determined by the lower source country tax rate.  
Equation (7) illustrates the NPV of the tax allowance granted by the source 
country, assuming straight-line depreciation.23 Variable ߮ௌ  denotes the 
periodical depreciation rate and variable ݑ݈ depicts the useful life for tax 
purposes where ݑ݈ ൌ 1 ߮ௌ⁄ . 
ܣ௦௟,ௌ்௉ ൌ ߬ௌ ∗ ܶܲ ∗ ߮ௌ ∗ ሺ ଵሺଵା௜ሻభ ൅ ⋯൅
ଵ
ሺଵା௜ሻೠ೗ሻ ൌ ߬ௌ ∗ ܶܲ ∗
ఝೄ
௜ ቀ1 െ
ଵ
ሺଵା௜ሻೠ೗ቁ    (7) 
Equation (7) is further simplified (equation (7’)) by making use of the present 
value factor c. For the case of straight-line depreciation, the present value factor 
ܿ is reflected by equation (8).24 
ܣௌ்௉ ൌ ߬ௌ ∗ ܿ ∗ ܶܲ           (7’) 
ܿ ൌ ఝೄ௜ ቀ1 െ
ଵ
ሺଵା௜ሻೠ೗ቁ           (8) 
Analogous to the immediate deduction of the R&D investment expenditures 
granted by the residence country (denoted by the term ߮଴߬௉ in the first term of 
equation (6)), the step-up increases the after-tax NPV of the investment project. 
In fact, the step-up may partly compensate for the exit tax’s negative effect on 
the NPV. This is analysed in more detail in section 3.1.3. 
It is interesting to note that the recapture of the immediate deduction of the R&D 
investment expenses caused by the exit taxation and the subsequent step-up in 
the source country involves a switch from a cash-flow tax (immediate deduction 
of investment expenditures) to a profit tax (periodical depreciation of investment 
expenditures).  
                                                 
23  This is the most common tax depreciation method for intangibles. For the EU member 
states, see Spengel et al. (2014), Table A-8, pp. A-21 set seq. For additional countries see 
CBT Tax Database, download: http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/ideas-
impact/tax/publications/data. 
24  Corresponding factors may be derived for other depreciation methods such as declining-
balance depreciation. See Devereux et al. (2008), p. B-2. 
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3.1.1.3 Third tax consequence: taxation of the investment returns in the 
residence country of the subsidiary instead of in the parent country 
As a third tax consequence of the disposal, the returns from exploiting the 
patent are subject to corporate income tax in the source country at the rate ߬ௌ. 
This is reflected by the third term of equation (6). Hence, by transferring the 
patent to a subsidiary resident in a lower-tax country, the multinational company 
is able to reduce the tax burden on the returns from exploiting the patent. This 
positively affects the after-tax NPV of the investment project. 
3.1.2 Determining the transfer price and the exit tax base 
Transfer pricing rules generally require that the sale price paid by the subsidiary 
is in line with the arm’s length principle. This involves that the intra-group 
disposal of the patent must be set by reference to what would have been agreed 
by unrelated parties in identical or at least comparable transactions.25 However, 
due to the uniqueness of intangible assets, comparable prices from transactions 
with unrelated parties as required by the arm’s length principle are rarely 
available.26 The ‘cost approach’ and the ‘income approach’ constitute two 
alternative approaches to the ‘market approach’, on which transfer pricing rules 
are based. The ‘cost approach’ approximates the value of an asset by referring to 
the costs of its creation (increased by the costs of its disposal). However, it is 
widely perceived that the costs incurred in the creation of an intangible asset are 
no suitable indicator for their value.27 The ‘income approach’ estimates the value 
of an intangible asset by referring to the estimated value of the future economic 
benefits which the asset is expected to generate during its economic lifetime.28  
                                                 
25  See Article 9 (1) OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, Boos (2003), p. 3, 
Cottani (2011), pp. 19 et seq., Henshall (2013), pp. 5 et seq. and 14 et seq. 
26  We will not address the theoretical issues associated with the arm’s length principle here. 
For details, see Boos (2003), p. 12, Biegalskie (2010), Durst (2010), p. 249, Devereux and 
Keuschnigg (2009). 
27  See Boos (2003), p. 77. 
28  See Boos (2003), p. 81. 
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According to the recent discussion draft of chapter six of the OECD transfer 
pricing guidelines,29 income-based techniques such as valuation techniques 
drawn from financial valuation practice may, depending on the circumstances, 
be used as part of one of the methods approved by the OECD30 or as an 
independent transfer pricing method.31  
We do not address the complex issues associated with the choice and the 
application of the various transfer pricing methods proposed in the OECD 
transfer pricing guidelines to intangible assets32. Instead we generalise this 
issue by assuming that the transfer price is based on the earnings value (EV) of 
the patent. This value can be determined based on the economic parameters of 
the model.33 As depicted by equation (9), the earnings value is determined as 
the present value of the sum of future cash-flows generated by exploiting the 
patent, which is equal to the sum of the investment return (݌) and the economic 
depreciation rate (ߜ).34 
ܧܸ ൌ ∑ ሺ௣ାఋሻሺଵାగሻೞሺଵିఋሻೞషభሺଵା௜ሻೞஶ௦ୀଵ           (9) 
                                                 
29  See OECD (2013b). The version of the draft of chapter six of the OECD transfer pricing 
guidelines published in July 2013 still constitutes a working document and does not yet 
reflect a consensus among OECD member states. 
30  In general, the transfer pricing methods put forward in chapter two of the OECD transfer 
pricing guidelines also pertain to transactions involving intangible assets: the ‘comparable 
uncontrolled price method’ (CUP), the ‘resale price method’, the ‘cost-plus method’, the 
‘transactional net margin method’, and the ‘transactional profit split method’. See OECD 
(2010), para 6.13, OECD (2013b), para 125.  
31  See OECD (2012b), para 109. 
32  See Boos (2003), p. 11-14. 
33  The transfer price stipulated by tax provisions may also exceed the earnings value as 
determined from the perspective of the selling party. To give an example, the business 
restructuring provisions introduced in Germany in 2008 require that when determining 
transfer prices for whole business units, synergies generated by the acquiring party as well 
as profits associated with lower operating costs in the residence country of the acquiring 
party also have to be taken into account. See Wolter (2011), p. 356. 
34  Drawing on Klemm (2012). 
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Assuming that ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ ሺ1 ൅ ߨሻ⁄  (so called ‘Fisher effect’35), equation (9) 
can be simplified to the following: 
ܧܸ ൌ ∑ ሺ௣ାఋሻሺଵିఋሻೞషభሺଵା௥ሻೞஶ௦ୀଵ           (9’) 
Rearranging equation (9’) yields: 
ܧܸ ൌ ሺ݌ ൅ ߜሻ ∗ ሺଵାగሻ௜ାఋሺଵାగሻିగ        (9’’) 
This can be further simplified so the earnings value equals the sum of future 
cash-flows multiplied by a present value factor denoted by variable b 
(ܾ ൌ ሺଵାగሻሺ௜ାఋሺଵାగሻିగሻ).  
ܧܸ ൌ ሺ݌ ൅ ߜሻ ∗ ܾ                   (9’’’) 
As comparable prices for intangible assets from transactions with unrelated 
parties as required by the arm’s length principle in many cases do not exist, 
taxpayers face a considerable leeway when it comes to valuing intangible assets 
for transfer pricing purposes. This leeway might enable multinational firms to get 
away with systematically under-evaluating the value of intangible assets that are 
sold to affiliates in low-tax countries for tax purposes. We take this into account 
by assuming that the transfer price only equals a share of the full earnings value 
depicted by ߙ. This is illustrated by equations (10) and (10’) denoting the 
transfer price for the disposal of the patent. 
ܶܲா௏ ൌ ߙ ∗ ܧܸ ൌ ߙ ∗ ሺଵାగሻ௜ାఋሺଵାగሻିగ ሺ݌ ൅ ߜሻ        (10) 
ܶܲா௏ ൌ ߙ ∗ ܧܸ ൌ ߙ ∗ ܾሺ݌ ൅ ߜሻ         (10’) 
Inserting ܣௌ்௉ ൌ ߬ௌ ∗ ܶܲா௏ ∗ ܿ (equation (7’)) and ܶܲா௏ ൌ ߙܾሺ݌ ൅ ߜሻ (equation 
(10’)) in equation (6) allows us to specify the after-tax NPV for the case that the 
earnings value is taken as a basis in determining the transfer price (equation 
(11)). 
 
                                                 
35  See Fisher (1930).  
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ܴ ൌ െ൫1 െ ߮଴߬௉ െ ߬ௌ ∗ ߙܾܿሺ݌ ൅ ߜሻ൯ െ ߬௉ ∗ ߙܾሺ݌ ൅ ߜሻ ൅ ሺ݌ ൅ ߜሻሺ1 ൅ ߨሻ1 ൅ ݅ ሺ1 െ ߬ௌሻ 
൅ ሺଵିఋሻሺଵାగሻ൫ଵିఝబఛುିఛೄ∗ఈ௕௖ሺ௣ାఋሻାఛು∗ఈ௕ሺ௣ାఋሻ൯ଵା௜        (11) 
From this, the cost of capital is derived by setting equation (11) equal to zero and 
isolating the rate of return ݌ yielding equation (12). This deviates from the 
standard formula for a domestic investment where the parent both creates and 
exploits the patent depicted by equation (3) with respect to the second term of 
the denominator.  
݌෤ ൌ ሺଵିఝబఛುሻሺ୧ାఋሺଵାగሻିగሻሺଵାగሻሺଵିఛೄሻା௔௕ሺ௖ఛೄିఛುሻሺ୧ାఋሺଵାగሻିగሻ െ ߜ        (12) 
The EATR is finally determined by drawing on equation (11) following the same 
approach as in section 2 for domestic investments. 
3.1.3 Disentangling the tax effects associated with the disposal 
The three tax consequences of the disposal of the patent - the exit tax, the step-
up and taxing of the returns at the source country tax rate - all affect the after-tax 
NPV of the cross-border investment and consequentially the effective tax burden 
in different ways. The exit tax negatively affects the after-tax NPV of the 
investment, whereas the step-up granted by the source country affects it 
positively. The effect of the application of the source country (instead of the 
residence country) tax rate on the patent income tax burden depends on the tax 
rate differential. If the source country tax rate is lower than the residence country 
tax rate, the after-tax NPV is positively affected by the application of the source 
country tax rate. A higher source country tax rate has the opposite effect.  
In the following section, we examine the individual tax effects in order to point 
out the conditions under which the disposal of a patent to a low-tax country 
achieves its tax planning objective of reducing the group’s overall tax burden 
compared to a domestic investment of the parent. We show that in case the 
disposal of a patent to a lower-tax country triggers an exit tax on the full earnings 
value, the overall effect on the after-tax NPV of the investment is generally 
negative. This implies that the disposal does not achieve the tax planning 
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objective. In contrast to this, if only a share of the earnings value is subject to 
the exit tax, the disposal may result in a lower after-tax NPV compared to a 
domestic investment of the parent company indicating that the disposal 
achieves its tax planning objective. 
3.1.3.1 Effects of the disposal of a patent which triggers an exit tax on the full 
earnings value 
In order to point out whether the disposal positively or negatively affects the 
after-tax NPV and thereby the effective tax burden, we determine the difference 
between the after-tax NPV of a cross-border investment and the after-tax NPV of 
a purely domestic investment of the parent. This is denoted by variable ∆ܴ and 
illustrated by equation (13). Drawing on the equation for the EATR,36 a positive 
effect of the disposal on the after-tax NPV (illustrated by ∆ܴ ൐ 0) leads to a 
reduction of the effective average tax burden due to the disposal.  
∆ܴ ൌ ்ܴ௥௔௡௦௙௘௥ െ ܴ஽௢௠௘௦௧௜௖          (13) 
∆ܴ ൌ ܣௌ்௉ െ ܣௌ்௉ ሺଵିఋሻሺଵାగሻଵା௜ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ா௙௙௘௖௧	௢௙	௧௛௘	௦௧௘௣ି௨௣
െ߬௉ܶܲ ൅ ߬௉ܶܲ ሺଵିఋሻሺଵାగሻଵା௜ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ா௙௙௘௖௧	௢௙	௧௛௘	௘௫௜௧	௧௔௫
൅ ሺ߬௉ െ ߬ௌሻ ሺ௣ାఋሻሺଵାగሻଵା௜ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ா௙௙௘௖௧	௢௡ି௚௢௜௡௚	௧௔௫	௕௨௥ௗ௘௡
  (13’) 
By replacing ܣௌ்௉ by ߬ௌ ∗ ܶܲ ∗ ܿ (equation (7’)), equation (13’) can be further 
simplified to the following: 
∆ܴ ൌ െሺ߬௉ െ ߬ௌܿሻ ∗ ܶܲ ∗ ቀ1 െ ሺଵିఋሻሺଵାగሻଵା௜ ቁ ൅ ሺ߬௉ െ ߬ௌሻ
ሺ௣ାఋሻሺଵାగሻ
ଵା௜      (14) 
In the following, we assume that the full earnings value is taken as a basis for 
the sale price of the patent. Inserting equation (10’) where ߙ ൌ 1 results in 
equation (15).  
∆ܴ ൌ െሺ߬௉ െ ߬ௌܿሻ ∗ ሺ݌ ൅ ߜሻ ሺଵାగሻ௜ାఋሺଵାగሻିగ ∗ ቀ1 െ
ሺଵିఋሻሺଵାగሻ
ଵା௜ ቁ ൅ ሺ߬௉ െ ߬ௌሻ
ሺ௣ାఋሻሺଵାగሻ
ଵା௜   (15) 
This can be further simplified to equations (15’) and (15’’).  
∆ܴ ൌ െሺ߬௉ െ ߬ௌܿሻ ∗ ሺ௣ାఋሻሺଵାగሻሺଵା௜ሻ ∗ ቀ
௜ାఋሺଵାగሻିగ
௜ାఋሺଵାగሻିగቁ ൅ ሺ߬௉ െ ߬ௌሻ
ሺ௣ାఋሻሺଵାగሻ
ଵା௜    (15’) 
                                                 
36  See equation (5) in section 2. 
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∆ܴ ൌ 	െሺ߬௉ െ ߬ௌܿሻ ሺ௣ାఋሻሺଵାగሻଵା௜ ൅ ሺ߬௉ െ ߬ௌሻ
ሺ௣ାఋሻሺଵାగሻ
ଵା௜ ൏ 0    (15’’) 
Equation (15’’) shows that the disposal of a patent triggering an exit tax on the 
full earnings value reduces the after-tax NPV of the investment as opposed to a 
domestic investment of the parent (recall ܿ ∈ ሺ0; 1ሻ)37. This finding is 
independent from whether the tax rate differential is positive or negative. Hence, 
the disposal also reduces the NPV if the source country tax rate exceeds the 
residence county tax rate. The after-tax NPV is only unaffected by the disposal in 
case the source country tax rate is zero.  
The reason for the general negative effect of the disposal on the NPV is that the 
negative effect of an exit tax on the full earnings value of the patent 
overcompensates the positive effect of a lower on-going tax burden on the 
patent income (considering a transfer to a low-tax country) and of a higher 
depreciable base in the source country due to a ‘step-up’.  
In summary, if the full earnings value is subject to the exit tax, the disposal of a 
patent to a low-taxed subsidiary does not achieve the tax planning objective of 
reducing the group’s effective average tax burden compared to a domestic 
investment of the parent. In fact, the opposite is the case: the disposal 
increases the effective average tax burden. This finding is independent from the 
tax rate differential. 
3.1.3.2 Effects of the disposal of a patent if the transfer price falls below the full 
earnings value 
However, the disposal may result in a higher after-tax NPV in case the transfer 
price only corresponds to a fraction of the earnings value (implying ߙ ൏ 1). The 
reason for this is that the lower the transfer price, the smaller the (negative) 
effect of the exit tax. If the transfer price is low enough, the combined effect of 
the step-up and the application of lower source country tax rate on the 
investment return may over-compensate the exit tax effect.  
                                                 
37  As a consequence, according to the amount, the first term of equation (15’’) is smaller than 
the second term, rendering equation (15’’) negative. 
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This indicates that if the tax administration of the parent company’s residence 
country is not able to enforce a transfer price which equals the full earnings 
value upon the disposal of intangible assets, it is possible for multinational 
groups to reduce their overall tax burden by shifting intangible assets and 
thereby profits to low-tax countries. 
In the following, we determine the share of the earnings value which leaves the 
after-tax NPV of the investment unaffected from the disposal (implying ∆ܴ ൌ 0). 
This is denoted by variable ߙො which is derived by inserting equation (10’) in 
equation (14) (yielding equation 16) and then isolating variable ߙ. 
∆ܴ ൌ 	െߙሺ߬௉ െ ߬ௌܿሻ ሺ௣ାఋሻሺଵାగሻଵା௜ ൅ ሺ߬௉ െ ߬ௌሻ
ሺ௣ାఋሻሺଵାగሻ
ଵା௜ ൌ 0      (16) 
ߙො ൌ ሺఛುିఛೄሻሺఛುିఛೄ௖ሻ             (17) 
For ߙ ൏ ߙො, the disposal to a lower-tax country is associated with a positive effect 
on the after-tax NPV and thereby a reduction of the effective tax burden of the 
group. The larger the (positive) tax rate differential, the larger the share of the 
earnings value which is still associated with a tax advantage of the disposal. 
3.2 Licensing-out the patent to an operating subsidiary 
Instead of transferring the legal ownership of the patent, the parent may transfer 
the right to temporarily exploit the asset by way of a licensing-arrangement, 
thereby retaining the legal ownership. Equation (18) illustrates the after-tax NPV 
of an equity-financed cross-border R&D investment giving rise to a patent, which 
is then licensed-out to a foreign subsidiary.  
ܴ ൌ െሺ1 െ ߮௢߬௉ሻᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
௧௘௥௠	ଵ
െ ሺ1 െ ߬ௌߚௌ௥ሻ ோ௢௬ଵା௜ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
௧௘௥௠	ଶ
൅ ሺ1 െ ߬௉ሻ ோ௢௬ଵା௜ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
௧௘௥௠	ଷ
൅ ሺ1 െ ߬௦ሻ ሺ௣ାఋሻሺଵାగሻଵା௜ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
௧௘௥௠	ସ
൅
ሺଵିఝ೚ఛುሻሺଵିఋሻሺଵାగሻ
ଵା௜ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
௧௘௥௠	ହ
                 (18)38 
                                                 
38  As in the domestic case, the last term of equation (18) (term five) reflects that the model 
considers a one-period perpetuation of the capital stock instead of a permanent increase of 
the capital stock. 
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The licensing arrangement has the following tax consequences. First, the royalty 
payment (denoted by ܴ݋ݕ) is tax deductible at the level of the subsidiary 
(second term of equation (18)). This deduction gives rise to a tax shield equal to 
the product of the royalty payment and the profit tax rate. Here, variable ߚௌ௥ 
denotes the share of the royalties that may be deducted. If royalty payments are 
fully tax deductible, ߚௌ௥ is one and the value of the royalty tax shield equals the 
source country tax rate.  
Second, on the level of the parent the royalty payment is subject to corporate 
income tax (third term). We assume that the royalties are not subject to source 
country withholding tax. This assumption in particular holds true for 
multinational groups of companies resident in the EU where the Interest & 
Royalty Directive ensures that royalties are exempt from withholding taxes upon 
meeting certain participation requirements.  
Third, the return from exploiting the patent is subject to corporate income tax in 
the source country at the rate ߬ௌ (fourth term). As in the case of the disposal of 
the patent, the licensing arrangement enables the multinational company to 
make use of lower foreign tax rates. Also with respect to the first and the second 
tax consequences, parallels can be drawn between the disposal of a patent and 
licensing-out of a patent. The taxation of the royalty income in the residence 
country corresponds to the exit tax levied upon the disposal of a patent, 
whereas the deduction of the royalty payment from the source country profit tax 
base corresponds to the step-up in the depreciable base granted by the source 
country. There is, however, a timing difference between these two tax planning 
strategies. Whereas the royalties are taxed on a staggered basis, the exit tax is 
generally fully due upon disposal. 
As illustrated by equation (19), the license fee (ܴ݋ݕ) is determined as a share of 
the overall return, analogous to the case of a disposal of the patent. This leads 
to equation (20). 
ܴ݋ݕ ൌ ߙሺ݌ ൅ ߜሻሺ1 ൅ ߨሻ           (19) 
ܴ ൌ െሺ1 െ ߮௢߬௉ሻ ൅ ߙ ሺఉೄ
ೝఛೄିఛುሻሺ௣ାఋሻሺଵାగሻ
ଵା௜ ൅
ሺଵିఛೞሻሺ௣ାఋሻሺଵାగሻ
ଵା௜ ൅
ሺଵିఋሻሺଵାగሻሺଵିఝ೚ఛುሻ
ଵା௜   (20) 
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When abstracting from any current expenses that might be incurred at the level 
of the subsidiary in the course of its business, the overall return denoted by 
ሺ݌ ൅ ߜሻሺ1 ൅ ߨሻ equals the turnover from exploiting. Hence, determining the license 
fee as a share of the overall return from exploiting the patent corresponds to 
determining the license fee based on turnover as promoted by the OECD transfer 
pricing guidelines.39  
In the following, we examine in which cases the licensing-out of a patent to a 
low-taxed subsidiary increases the after-tax NPV of investment (∆ܴ ൐ 0) and 
thereby reduces the effective average tax burden of the group. Equation (21) 
denotes the difference between the after-tax NPV of a cross-border investment 
involving the licensing-out of a patent to the subsidiary and the after-tax NPV of 
a domestic investment of the parent. The first term illustrates the combined 
effect of the royalty tax shield on the level of the subsidiary and the tax burden 
on the royalties in the hands of the parent. The effect of the licensing-
arrangement on the on-going tax burden of the patent income is reflected by the 
second term of equation (21). 
∆ܴ ൌ െߙ ሺ௣ାఋሻሺଵାగሻଵା௜ ሺ߬௉ െ ߚ௦௥߬ௌሻ ൅ ሺ߬௉ െ ߬ௌሻ
ሺ௣ାఋሻሺଵାగሻ
ଵା௜       (21) 
If the royalty is fully deductible from the source country profit tax base (ߚ௦௥ ൌ 1) 
and the royalty equals the full return (ߙ ൌ 1), this difference is zero as depicted 
by equation (22). From this follows that a licensing arrangement leaves the after-
tax NPV unaffected if it involves that the overall return from exploiting the patent 
is fully shifted from the subsidiary to the parent through a royalty payment. This 
furthermore implies that the licensing arrangement does not achieve its tax 
planning objective of reducing the group’s overall tax burden compared to a 
domestic investment of the parent. 
∆ܴ ൌ െሺ߬௉ െ ߬ௌሻ ሺ௣ାఋሻሺଵାగሻଵା௜ ൅ ሺ߬௉ െ ߬ௌሻ
ሺ௣ାఋሻሺଵାగሻ
ଵା௜ ൌ 0     (22) 
In turn, if the royalty equals only a share of the overall return generated by 
exploiting the patent (ߙ ൏ 1), the effect of the licensing arrangement depends 
                                                 
39  See OECD (2010), para 6.16. 
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on the tax rate differential between the source and the residence country. 
Licensing-out the patent to a lower-tax country increases the after-tax NPV of the 
investment. Thereby it reduces the group’s effective tax burden compared to a 
domestic investment of the parent. In the opposite case, the licensing 
arrangement reduces the after-tax NPV and thereby increases the effective tax 
burden. 
As a result, if the goal is to reduce the group’s overall effective average tax 
burden by means of licensing intangible assets to low-taxed subsidiaries, it is 
necessary to set the royalty payment to less than the overall return generated 
from exploiting the patent (ߙ ൏ 1). 
Equation (23) finally depicts the cost of capital for the case of intra-group 
licensing. This equation deviates from the standard formula for a domestic 
investment where the parent both creates and exploits the patent depicted by 
equation (3) with respect to the second term of the denominator.  
݌෤ ൌ ሺଵିఝ೚ఛುሻሺ௜ାఋሺଵାగሻିగሻሺଵାగሻሺଵିఛೄሻାሺଵାగሻఈ൫ఉೄೝఛೄିఛು൯ െ ߜ         (23) 
The EATR is determined by drawing on equation (20) following the same 
approach as in section 2 for domestic investments.  
3.3 Contract R&D 
As a third tax planning model, we finally look at the case that the subsidiary 
commissions the parent to perform R&D activity on its behalf giving rise to a 
patent. As a consequence, the subsidiary becomes the legal owner of the patent. 
In turn, the parent receives a contract R&D fee from the subsidiary as 
reimbursement for its services.  
From the perspective of the subsidiary, the contract R&D fee constitutes the 
production costs for creating a self-developed intangible asset.40 As these 
expenses are current in nature, they are generally immediately tax deductible. 
Among the EU member states, the vast majority of countries does not require the 
                                                 
40  See Vögele (ed.) (2011), p. 1303, para 115.  
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capitalisation of self-developed intangible assets.41 Hence, the tax treatment of 
the contract R&D fee equals the treatment of current expenses incurred with 
respect to internal R&D activity.42 
3.3.1.1 Application of the cost-plus method when reimbursing the contractor  
Equation (24) illustrates the after-tax NPV of an equity-financed cross-border 
R&D investment which gives rise to a patent by way of contract R&D. In case the 
principal bears the risks relating to the success of the R&D activity and the 
commercial exploitation of the intangible assets, the cost-plus method is 
generally considered to be appropriate to determine the contract R&D fee, 
provided a comparable uncontrolled price is not available.43 This requires that 
the principal manages and controls the party carrying out the R&D activity.44 In 
order to do so, the principal must have the appropriate resources, including 
adequately educated staff.45  
ܴ ൌ
െሺ1 െ ߮଴߬௉ሻᇣᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇥ
௧௘௥௠	ଵ
െ ሺ1 ൅ ݀ሻሺ߬௉ െ ߬ௌሻᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
௧௘௥௠	ଶ
൅ ሺ௣ାఋሻሺଵାగሻሺଵା௜ሻ ሺ1 െ ߬ௌሻᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
௧௘௥௠	ଷ
൅
ሺଵିఝబఛುାሺଵାௗሻሺఛುିఛೄሻሻሺଵିఋሻሺଵାగሻ
ሺଵା௜ሻᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
௧௘௥௠	ସ
        (24) 
The cost-plus method involves that this contract R&D fee equals the sum of the 
R&D costs incurred by the contract R&D service provider and a mark-up. The 
latter should reflect an appropriate profit earned by the contractor, taking into 
account the functions performed by him as well as the market conditions.46 
                                                 
41  See footnote 13. 
42  See Vögele (ed.) (2011), p. 1303, para 115.  
43  See OECD (2010a), para 2.55, Russo (2007), p. 172. The OECD transfer pricing guidelines 
specify under which condition a party is considered to have control over the risks 
associated with the creation and exploitation of intangible assets (see OECD (2010a), paras 
9.23-9.24 and 9.26). For the legal situation in Germany, see Vögele (ed.) (2011), p. 1305, 
para 121. 
44  See Sporken and Gommers (2006), p. 267. 
45  See Russo (2007), p. 175. 
46  OECD (2010a), para 2.39.  
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Variable d in equation (24) denotes this mark-up. The contract R&D fee therefore 
amounts to 1 ൅ ݀. 
The contract R&D arrangement has the following tax consequences. First, the 
contract R&D fee is subject to corporate income tax in the residence country. 
Second, the fee is tax deductible at the level of the subsidiary. These two 
aspects are reflected by the second term of equation (24). Third, the returns from 
exploiting the patent are subject to corporate income tax in the source country at 
the rate ߬ௌ instead of at the parent country tax rate (see term three of equation 
(24)).47  
In the following, we point out in which cases the contract R&D arrangement 
increases the after-tax NPV of investment and thereby reduces the effective 
average tax burden of the group. Equation (25) depicts the difference between 
the after-tax NPV of a cross-border investment involving contract R&D and the 
after-tax NPV of a domestic investment of the parent. The first term reflects the 
net effect of the taxation of the contract R&D fee in the residence country and the 
tax deduction of the contract R&D fee in the source country. 
∆ܴ ൌ െሺ1 ൅ ݀ሻሺ߬௉ െ ߬ௌሻሺ1 െ ሺଵିఋሻሺଵାగሻሺଵା௜ሻ ሻ ൅ ሺ߬௉ െ ߬ௌሻ
ሺ௣ାఋሻሺଵାగሻ
ሺଵା௜ሻ     (25) 
Whether the contract R&D arrangement positively or negatively affects the after-
tax NPV of the investment depends on the mark-up which enters the contract 
R&D fee, and on the tax rate differential between the source and the residence 
country. 
In case of a positive tax rate differential (denoted by ∆߬ ൌ ߬௉ െ ߬ௌ), the contract 
R&D arrangement results in a lower on-going tax burden as opposed to a 
domestic investment of the parent (illustrated by the second term of equation 
(25)). In contrast to this, the net effect of the taxation of the contract R&D fee in 
the residence country and the tax deduction granted by the source country 
                                                 
47  Again, the last term of equation (24) reflects that the model considers a one-period 
perpetuation of the capital stock instead of a permanent increase. 
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(illustrated by the first term of equation (25)) is negative. In case the tax rate 
differential is negative, the effects have the opposite algebraic sign.  
It depends on the size of the mark-up which effect finally prevails and whether 
the contract R&D arrangement as a consequence results in an overall negative or 
positive effect on the after-tax net present value. Equation (26) defines the mark-
up for which both effects exactly offset each other and thereby leave the after-
tax NPV of the investment unaffected. Please note that this is independent from 
the tax rates in the source and the residence country. 
መ݀ ൌ ሺ௣ାఋሻሺଵାగሻሺ௜ାఋሺଵାగሻିగሻ െ 1          (26) 
In case the mark-up falls below the critical mark-up denoted by መ݀, a positive tax 
rate differential (߬௉ ൐ ߬ௌ) is generally associated with a positive effect of the 
contract R&D arrangement on the after-tax NPV of the investment which implies 
that the contract R&D arrangement achieves a reduction of the group’s overall 
effective tax burden.  
Equation (27) finally illustrates the cost of capital in case the parent is 
reimbursed for its contract R&D services based on the cost-plus method. In the 
following, we additionally consider the case that the profit split method is 
applied instead. 
݌෤ ൌ ሺଵିఝబఛುሻሺ௜ାఋሺଵାగሻିగሻାሺଵାௗሻሺఛುିఛೄሻሺ௜ାఋሺଵାగሻିగሻሺଵାగሻሺଵିఛೄሻ െ ߜ       (27) 
Equation (27) deviates from the standard formula for a domestic investment 
where the parent both creates and exploits the patent (depicted by equation (3)) 
with respect to the second term in the numerator.  
3.3.1.2 Application of the profit split method when reimbursing the contractor 
According to the OECD transfer pricing guidelines, the transactional profit split 
method is generally considered to be the most appropriate method to determine 
an arm’s length price in case of transactions concerning intangible assets where 
both parties contribute unique and valuable intangibles and both perform 
relevant functions relating to developing, enhancing, maintaining, and 
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protecting intangible asset and make decisions regarding whether to pursue or 
terminate particular R&D projects. In contrast, the profit split method should not 
be used if one party to the transaction only contributes simple functions without 
providing a unique contribution.48  
Hence, the advocates of the profit split method generally claim that in the 
situation at hand contract R&D does not merely constitute a ‘routine function’ 
but rather also economically significant functions. To give an example, the 
Indian Department of Revenue has promoted the application of the profit split 
method instead of the cost-plus method with respect to the pricing of contract 
R&D services arguing that the R&D service providers perform economically 
significant functions.49 Drawing on the OECD transfer pricing guidelines, the 
crucial point in assessing the appropriateness of the profit split method in the 
context of contract R&D is whether the contract R&D is carried out on the risk 
and account and under the direction and supervision of the principal or whether 
the contractor carries out the essential functions for creating the intangible 
assets.  
In the following, we point out how the application of the profit split method 
affects the after-tax NPV of investment and thereby the incentive to create 
intangible assets by way of intra-group contract R&D on behalf of a low-taxed 
subsidiary. In order to incorporate the profit split method, the same approach is 
applied as in the case of disposal of the patent.  
Equation (28) presents the after-tax NPV for the case of contract R&D assuming 
that gross profits from exploiting the patent (amounting to ሺ݌ ൅ ߜሻሺ1 ൅ ߨሻ), 
instead of the operating profits, are split between the parent and the 
subsidiary.50 Variable ߙ denotes the share of gross profit attributed to the parent 
company carrying out the R&D activity by means of the profit split. This equation 
                                                 
48  See OECD (2010), para 2.109, OECD (2013b), para 80 and examples 13 and 14 on pp. 61 et 
seq. 
49  See Chakravarty and Ray (2013), p. 404, Mitra et al. (2013), Prakash (2013), p. 376.  
50  See OECD (2010), para 2.131, Vögele (ed.), p. 338, para 332. 
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largely corresponds to the after-tax NPV in case of a domestic investment of the 
parent denoted by equation (1) in section 2. The only difference is that part of 
the overall return is subject to the source country tax rate.  
ܴ ൌ െሺ1 െ ߮଴߬௉ሻ ൅ ሺ௣ାఋሻሺଵାగሻሺଵା௜ሻ ሺ1 െ ሺ1 െ ߙሻ߬ௌ െ ߙ߬௉ሻ ൅
ሺଵିఋሻሺଵାగሻሺଵିఝబఛುሻ
ሺଵା௜ሻ   (28) 
A contract R&D arrangement where the contract R&D fee equals the full return of 
the patent (implying ߙ ൌ 1) leaves the after-tax NPV of the investment 
unaffected because the return earned on the level of the subsidiary is fully 
shifted to the parent company by means of the contract R&D fee. This is 
analogous to the finding for the case of licensing-out analysed in the previous 
section.  
If the profit is in fact split between the parent and the subsidiary (implying ߙ ൏
1), the contract R&D arrangement always reduces the after-tax NPV of the 
investment compared to a domestic investment of the parent. This is 
demonstrated by equation (29) which depicts the difference between the after-
tax NPV of a cross-border investment involving contract R&D and the after-tax 
NPV of a domestic investment of the parent. For positive tax rate differentials 
ሺ߬௉ ൐ ߬ௌ), this difference is always positive. 
∆ܴ ൌ ሺ௣ାఋሻሺଵାగሻሺଵା௜ሻ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ߬௉ െ ߬ௌሻ        (29) 
Equation (30) finally illustrates the cost of capital in case the parent is 
reimbursed for its contract R&D services based on the profit split method. It 
deviates from the standard formula for a domestic investment (depicted by 
equation (3)) with respect to the denominator.  
݌෤ ൌ ሺଵିఝబఛುሻሺ௜ାఋሺଵାగሻିగሻሺଵିሺଵିఈሻఛೄିఈఛುሻሺଵାగሻ െ ߜ         (30)
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4 Effective Tax Rates under IP Tax Planning 
Here, we present cost of capital and effective average tax rates (EATR) for an 
equity-financed cross-border investment in a self-developed patent involving the 
IP tax planning models discussed above. As a benchmark for analysing the 
effects of the IP tax planning strategies on the effective tax burden, we present 
figures for purely domestic investment of the parent. The effective tax measures 
serve to illustrate the conclusions drawn in the analytical analysis presented in 
sections 3.1 to 3.3 above. In addition, we point out in detail the tax parameters 
which are associated with a lower overall tax burden of the multinational 
company, implying that the tax planning objective is achieved. We focus on the 
scenario that the source country tax rate is lower than the residence country tax 
rate. In doing so, we only vary the tax rate levied by the source country and keep 
the residence country tax rate fixed.  
Table 1: Economic parameters and tax parameters of the numerical example 
Economic parameters Tax parameters 
݅ 7.1% ݌ 20% ߬௣ 30% 
ߨ 2% ߜ 15.35% ߮௦ௗ 10% 
ݎ 5% ܧܸ 174% ݑ݈ 10 years 
 
The economic and tax parameters applied are presented in Table 1. We assume 
that current R&D expenses51 are subject to immediate deduction in both the 
residence and the source country and that self-developed intangible assets do 
not have to be capitalised in both countries. This holds true for the majority of 
EU Member States.52 We furthermore assume that the source country does not 
                                                 
51  Recall, in modelling the investment giving rise to a self-developed patent we assume that 
all investment costs are current in nature (e.g. wages for R&D staff or materials) as current 
expenses generally account for the largest share of R&D expenditures (see Cameron (1996), 
Dougherty et al. (2007), OECD (2012a)). 
52  Cyprus, Estonia, Portugal, Slovenia, and Sweden are an exception to this. For details, see 
footnote 13 in section 2. 
Abbreviations: ݅ – nominal interest rate, ߨ – inflation rate, ݎ – real interest rate, ݌ – rate of return, 
ߜ – economic depreciation rate, ܧܸ – earnings value, ߬௣ – residence country tax rate, ߮௦ௗ – 
straight-line depreciation rate, ݑ݈ – useful life for tax purposes. 
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levy any withholding tax on dividends or royalties paid to the parent company 
due to the application of the Parent & Subsidiary Directive and the Interest & 
Royalty Directive and that the residence country exempts foreign dividends from 
profit tax.53  
4.1 Disposal  
Table 2 reports the cost of capital and the EATR for cases in which the patent is 
transferred from the parent to the subsidiary and therefore triggers exit taxation. 
Recall that the cost of capital demonstrates the effect of tax on a marginal 
investment (one that just breaks even). The immediate deduction of the R&D 
investment expenditures, which are presumably fully current in nature, leads to 
cost of capital equal to the real market interest rate of 5%. This indicates that 
taxation does not affect the scale of the investment. In turn, cost of capital 
above the real interest rate of 5% implies that the respective investment (here 
the R&D investment) is treated in a less-beneficial way than a financial 
investment which serves as a benchmark for analysing the incentive effects of 
taxes on real investment (such as R&D investment).  
Table 2:  Cost of Capital and EATRs (%) in case of disposal of the patent 
(equity-financing) 
 Cost of Capital  Effective average tax rate (EATR) 
 Domestic 
investment 
ߙ  Domestic 
investment 
ߙ 
 1 0.8 0.6  1 0.8 0.6 
0 5.00 5.00 3.39 2.02  22.50 22.50 11.90 1.29 
5 5.00 5.45 3.95 2.66  22.50 25.16 15.79 6.42 
10 5.00 5.91 4.55 3.35  22.50 27.82 19.68 11.55 
20 5.00 6.91 5.85 4.89  22.50 33.14 27.47 21.81 
30 5.00 8.01 7.34 6.71  22.50 38.45 35.26 32.07 
Abbreviations: ߬௦ – source country tax rate, ܽ – share of the earnings value which is taken as a 
basis when determining the transfer price for the exit tax. 
  
                                                 
53  Among the EU-28 Member States, Ireland is the only country which does not exempt 
dividends from substantial participations in the hands of corporate shareholders (see 
Spengel et al. (2014), table A-9, pp. A-23 et seq).  
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The EATR demonstrates the effects of tax on profitable investment. This measure 
is therefore relevant when exploring how profit taxation influences a 
multinational company’s decision on where to carry out a profitable investment 
project and how to structure cross-border investment (e.g. by way of the IP tax 
planning models). 
In the following, we analyse the effects of a potential leeway in determining the 
earnings value of the patent for transfer pricing purposes and of a variation in 
the strictness of transfer pricing rules which govern the transfer of valuable IP. In 
order to do so, we vary the share of the earnings value ߙ which is taken as a 
basis when determining the transfer price and forms the tax base of the exit tax 
levied on the level of the parent company.  
The results presented in Table 2 confirm the hypotheses drawn in section 3.1.3. 
The disposal of the patent which triggers an exit tax on the full earnings value 
(implying ܽ ൌ 1), is associated with higher cost of capital and a higher EATR than 
a purely domestic investment of the parent, except if the source country tax rate 
is zero. In that case, the cost of capital and the EATR are unaffected by the 
disposal because the effect of the lower on-going tax burden exactly offsets the 
exit tax burden. 
The results furthermore confirm that the parent faces an incentive to underreport 
the value of the patent when transferring it to a lower-taxed subsidiary (implying 
ܽ ൏ 1). This is because the parent may thereby achieve a lower effective tax 
burden compared to the domestic investment. To cite an example, if the source 
tax rate amounts to 10% as opposed to a residence country tax rate of 30%, the 
disposal of a patent which triggers an exit tax on 60% of the earnings value 
(ܽ ൌ 0.6) is associated with an EATR of 11.55% as opposed to 22.50% in the 
domestic case.  
These results point to the attractiveness of transferring the patent at an early 
stage of the development process when its value is still uncertain. The 
intangible could then subsequently be further developed on the risk and 
account of the acquiring low-taxed subsidiary. The results also show that if the 
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source country tax rate is significantly lower than the residence country tax rate, 
transfer prices close to the full earnings value are nevertheless associated with 
lower effective tax burdens. For example, in case of a source country tax rate of 
5%, as opposed to a residence country tax rate of 30%, the disposal of the 
patent triggering an exit tax on 80% of the earnings value is associated with an 
effective average tax burden of the R&D investment of 15.79%, as opposed to 
22.50% in case of a domestic investment of the parent. IP Box regimes offer 
such low tax rates for royalty income (e.g. 0% in Malta, 2% in Cyprus, 2.5% in 
Liechtenstein, 5% in the Netherlands, and 5.84% in Belgium).54 
Table 3 reports the values of ߙො for different tax rates differentials. Recall, this is 
the share of the earnings value that leaves the after-tax NPV of the investment 
unaffected by the disposal. The larger the tax rate differential, the higher the 
share of the earnings value in which case the disposal still results in a reduction 
of the EATR compared to the domestic investment.  
Table 3: Share of the earnings value which leaves the effective tax burden 
unaffected of the disposal 
߬௦ (%) 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 
ߙො (%) 100.00 96.49 91.65 84.59 73.30 52.34 0.00 
 
4.2 Licensing-out 
Table 4 reports the cost of capital and the EATR for the case that the patent is 
licensed-out to the subsidiary instead of transferred on a permanent basis. The 
results show that, similar to the case of disposal, licensing arrangements only 
reduce the effective tax burden of the group if the royalty only corresponds to a 
faction of the return generated by exploiting the patent. In turn, if the royalty 
corresponds to the full return (implying ܽ ൌ 1), the individual tax consequences 
                                                 
54  For details, see Evers et al. (2014), table 1.  
Abbreviations: ߬௦ – source country tax rate, ߙො – share of the earnings value taken as a basis when 
determining the transfer price for the exit tax which leaves the effective tax measures unaffected. 
Evers and Spengel (2014)  Effective Tax Rates under IP Tax Planning 
 
33 
 
of the licensing arrangement55 exactly offset each other and thereby leave the 
effective tax burden unaffected. As a consequence, the cost of capital and the 
EATR equal the cost of capital and the EATR of a domestic investment of the 
parent, namely 5% and 22.5%, respectively. 
Table 4:  Cost of Capital and EATRs (%) in case the patent is licensed-out  
(equity-financing) 
 Cost of Capital  Effective average tax rate (EATR) 
 Domestic 
investment 
ߙ  Domestic 
investment 
ߙ 
 1 0.8 0.6  1 0.8 0.6 
0 5.00 5.00 3.39 2.02  22.50 22.50 11.90 1.29 
5 5.00 5.00 3.64 2.46  22.50 22.50 13.66 4.83 
10 5.00 5.00 3.90 2.91  22.50 22.50 15.43 8.36 
20 5.00 5.00 4.44 3.90  22.50 22.50 18.97 15.43 
30 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00  22.50 22.50 22.50 22.50 
Abbreviations: ߬௦ – source country tax rate, ܽ – share of the overall return generated by exploiting 
the patent which is taken as a basis when determining the license fee. 
 
In this regard, the effects of the licensing arrangement on the effective tax 
burden are fundamentally different from the effects of the disposal. Recall, the 
tax effects of the disposal (exit tax, step-up, and lower on-going taxation) do not 
offset each other if the sales price corresponds to the full earnings value 
(implying ܽ ൌ 1). The disposal involves that the immediate deduction of R&D 
expenses incurred for the creation of the patent is offset as the R&D expenses 
form part of the exit tax base (provide the transfer price does not fall below the 
R&D costs) and the patent is subsequently subject to periodical depreciation in 
the source country. As opposed to this, the royalties are immediately deductible 
in the source country. This ensures that the licensing arrangement does not 
affect the effective tax burden provided that the royalty corresponds to the 
overall return. As a consequence, the licensing arrangements is generally 
                                                 
55  Recall, these are the taxation of the royalty in the hands of the parent, the royalty tax shield 
on the level of the subsidiary and the lower on-going tax burden on the patent income 
because this income is subject to tax in the source country instead of in the residence 
country. 
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associated with lower cost of capital and lower EATRs than the disposal (except 
in case the source country tax rate is zero). To give an example, assuming that 
the source country tax rate is 20% and that alpha is 60%, the licensing 
arrangement is associated with an EATR of 15.43% whereas the EATR in case of 
disposal is 21.81%. 
In economic terms, the disposal and licensing-out of a patent only differ insofar 
as, due to the change in legal ownership, in case of disposal all future value 
increases/decreases accrue to the subsidiary, whereas they remain with the 
creator of the patent if they are licensed out.  
4.3 Contract R&D 
Table 5 finally reports the cost of capital and the EATRs for the scenario of a 
contract R&D arrangement. This tax planning model differs from the case of a 
disposal insofar as the application of the cost-plus method for determining the 
contract R&D fee is widely accepted, provided certain conditions are fulfilled. 
This is of importance because in case the contract R&D performer is reimbursed 
on a cost-plus basis, the returns generated from exploiting the patent largely 
accrue to the subsidiary instead of being shifted to the parent. As a result, the 
parent only receives a small share of the profits corresponding to the mark-up on 
the R&D investment expenses. The application of the cost-plus method when 
determining fees for contract R&D services requires that the subsidiary exercises 
control over the development, enhancement, maintenance or protection of 
intangible assets and bears the risks and cost associated with these functions.56  
  
                                                 
56  For details, see section 3.3.1. 
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Table 5:  Cost of Capital and EATRs (%) in case of intra-group contract R&D 
(application of the cost-plus method, equity-financing) 
 Cost of Capital Effective average tax rate (EATR) 
  ݀  ݀ 
߬௦ D 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.3 D 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.3 
0 5.00 5.31 5.61 5.92 6.22 6.83 22.50 1.53 3.05 4.58 6.11 9.16 
5 5.00 5.27 5.54 5.80 6.07 6.61 22.50 5.02 6.29 7.57 8.84 11.38 
10 5.00 5.23 5.45 5.68 5.90 6.36 22.50 8.52 9.54 10.55 11.57 13.61 
20 5.00 5.13 5.25 5.38 5.51 5.76 22.50 15.51 16.02 16.53 17.04 18.05 
30 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 22.50 22.50 22.50 22.50 22.50 22.50 
 
In order to point out the effect of the size of the mark-up on the cost of capital 
and the EATR, the mark-up is varied between 5% and 30%. We consider this to 
be a reasonable range of possible mark-ups due to the following considerations. 
Drawing on a survey carried out by PricewaterhouseCoopers, the EU Joint 
Transfer Pricing Forum (JTPF) indicates that the mark-ups for low value-adding 
services generally fall within a range of 3 to 10%, and often amount to around 
5%.57 Tax administrations may argue that contract R&D services do not 
constitute low-value services and thereby apply higher mark-ups than the ones 
indicated by the EU JTPF in practice.58 The Indian Finance Ministry’s Central 
Board of Direct Taxes recently issued safe harbour rules for intra-group contract 
R&D services carried out on behalf of non-resident associated enterprises. 
Taxpayers may apply for the application of the safe harbour ratios, provided that 
the contractor only assumes insignificant risks.59 For contract R&D services that 
                                                 
57  See EU Commission (2010), para 67, Suffer and Reichl (2010). Vögele claims that the 
bandwidths of mark-ups determined through database research often range between 1.5% 
and 12%. See Vögele (ed.) (2011), p. 1306, para 122. 
58  See Schoppe and Voltmer-Darmanyan (2012), p. 1254. 
59  Circular No. 6/2013, issued on 29 June 2013, specifies the conditions for identifying 
development centres engaged in contract R&D services with insignificant risk. For further 
details, see Chakravarty and Ray (2013), p. 405, Prakash (2013), pp. 376 et seq., Stewart 
(2013a). 
Abbreviations: D – Domestic investment of the parent company, ߬௦ – source country tax rate, ݀ – 
mark-up applied to the R&D investment expenditures for determining the contract R&D fee 
applying the cost-plus method. 
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wholly or partly relate to software development, the safe haven ratio is 30% of 
operating expenses. The respective ratio is 29% for contract R&D services that 
wholly or partly relate to generic pharmaceutical drugs.60 Tax practitioners stress 
that the safe harbour ratios issued by the Indian Finance Ministry’s Central 
Board of Direct Taxes may considerably exceed mark-ups which correspond to 
the arm’s length principle.61 Nevertheless, we apply a mark-up of 30% as the 
upper boundary of plausible mark-ups when determining the contract R&D fee.  
As depicted in Table 5, for marginal investments a contract R&D arrangement 
where the contractor is reimbursed based on the R&D costs results in an 
increase in the cost of capital compared to domestic investments. The reason for 
this is that the residence country levies tax on the mark-up even if the 
investment turns out to be unprofitable.  
For profitable investment projects, the contract R&D arrangement is associated 
with a reduction of the effective tax burden if the source country tax rate falls 
below the residence country tax rate. For example, in case of a source country 
tax rate of 10% as opposed to a residence country tax rate of 30%, a mark-up of 
10% is associated with an EATR of 9.54% as opposed to an EATR of 22.50% in 
case of a domestic investment of the parent. A mark-up as high as 30% is still 
associated with an EATR which is significantly lower than the EATR for domestic 
investment projects, namely 13.61% as opposed to 22.50%. 
Whether the contract R&D arrangement results in a reduction of the EATR of the 
group as a whole depends on the size of the mark-up applied. Drawing on 
equation (26) in Section 3.3 which defines the mark-up that leaves the after-tax 
NPV of the investment unaffected (denoted by መ݀) and assuming the economic 
parameters depicted in Table 1, the contract R&D arrangement is associated with 
                                                 
60  See Articles 10TA-10TG Indian Income Tax Rules 1962 as amended on 19 September 2013, 
Gandhi (2013), p. 1261. 
61  See Stewart (2013b), Chawla (2013), p. 247. 
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lower EATRs compared to the domestic investment of the parent if the mark-up is 
lower than approximately 73.7%.62 
This shows that contract R&D arrangements, whereby the commissioning party 
is considered to be entitled to the intangible-related returns according to 
transfer pricing rules, as it legally and economically exercises control over the 
R&D activity and bears the risks and the costs associated with the R&D 
investment, involve a significant potential to shift profits to low-taxed 
subsidiaries. 
Table 6:  Cost of Capital and EATRs (%) in case the profit split method is applied to 
determine the contract R&D fee (equity-financing) 
  Cost of Capital  Effective average tax rate (EATR) 
  Domestic 
investment 
ܽ  Domestic 
investment 
ܽ 
  1 0.8 0.6  1 0.8 0.6 
 Disposal  5.00 3.39 2.02   22.50 11.90 1.29 
0 License 5.00 5.00 3.39 2.02  22.50 22.50 11.90 1.29 
 Contract R&D  5.00 3.39 2.02   22.50 11.90 1.29 
 Disposal  5.45 3.95 2.66   25.16 15.79 6.42 
5 License 5.00 5.00 3.64 2.46  22.50 22.50 13.66 4.83 
 Contract R&D  5.00 3.64 2.46   22.50 13.66 4.83 
 Disposal  5.91 4.55 3.35   27.82 19.68 11.55 
10 License 5.00 5.00 3.90 2.91  22.50 22.50 15.43 8.36 
 Contract R&D  5.00 3.90 2.91   22.50 15.43 8.36 
 Disposal  6.91 5.85 4.89   33.14 27.47 21.81 
20 License 5.00 5.00 4.44 3.90  22.50 22.50 18.97 15.43 
 Contract R&D  5.00 4.44 3.90   22.50 18.97 15.43 
 Disposal  8.01 7.34 6.71   38.45 35.26 32.07 
30 License 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00  22.50 22.50 22.50 22.50 
 Contract R&D  5.00 5.00 5.00   22.50 22.50 22.50 
 
                                                 
62  As illustrated by equation (26) in section 3.3.1.1, the mark-up which leaves the after-tax NPV 
of the investment unaffected is independent from the size of the tax rate differential. 
Abbreviations: ߬௦ – source country tax rate, ܽ – share of the earnings value and the overall return 
generated by exploiting the patent, respectively, which is taken as a basis when determining the 
transfer price, the license fee, and the contract R&D fee, respectively. 
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The situation is different when assuming that the contractor does not merely 
perform a ‘routine function’ but instead performs economically significant 
functions. In this case, the profit split method is generally considered more 
appropriate than the cost-plus method.63 In this case, the cost of capital and the 
EATR correspond to the measures presented for the licensing arrangement as 
illustrated by the results presented in Table 6. It gives a comparison of the cost 
of capital and the EATRs under the three different tax planning scenarios when 
determining the transfer price, the license fee, and the contract R&D fee based 
on the return from exploiting the patent. 
Even if a larger share of the profit is attributed to the parent company carrying 
out the R&D activity than to the subsidiary commissioning the R&D activity, this 
would still be associated with a considerable reduction of the EATR, provided 
that the source country tax rate is significantly lower than the parent company 
tax rate. For example, in case of a source country tax rate of 10% and a 60/40 
profit split (ܽ ൌ 0.6) attributed to the parent company, the EATR is 8.36% in 
contrast to 22.50% in case of a domestic investment of the parent. The contract 
R&D arrangement is still associated with a considerable reduction of the EATR 
from 22.5% to 15.43% if as much as 80% of the profit is allocated to the parent 
(again given a source country tax rate of 10%).  
 
  
                                                 
63  See section 3.3.1.2. 
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5 Conclusion 
By means of IP tax planning, multinational companies may make use of a 
beneficial research infrastructure in one country and at the same time benefit 
from low tax rates on income from exploiting IP in another country (e.g. due to an 
IP Box regime). Popular IP tax planning models are the disposal of IP to 
subsidiaries resident in low-tax countries, intra-group licensing, and intra-group 
contract R&D. The underlying reasoning is to shift (future) profits from exploiting 
IP to a low-tax country, and thereby to reduce the overall tax burden of the 
multinational, without having to shift the R&D activity as well.  
Countries in which IP is created usually limit the leeway for such kind of profit 
shifting by means of transfer pricing rules. The analytical and quantitative 
findings presented above show that the disposal of a patent to a lower-taxed 
subsidiary does not achieve its profit shifting objective, if the transfer price 
reflects the true value of IP. In fact, the disposal of IP triggering an exit tax on the 
full earnings value of the IP increases the group’s effective tax burden. Hence, 
the disposal of IP to a lower-taxed subsidiary only achieves its tax planning 
objective of reducing the effective tax burden of a multinational group, if the 
multinational is able to understate the value of the asset when it is transferred. 
This implies that if the country in which the IP was created succeeds in levying 
an exit tax on the full earnings value of the IP upon its disposal, multinational 
groups of companies do not face an incentive to relocate IP to subsidiaries 
resident in low-tax countries. Though, in theory and in practice, identifying the 
‘true value’ of IP this is a difficult task if not impossible.  
Analogous to this, licensing-out a patent to a low-taxed subsidiary does not 
achieve a lower effective average tax burden of the group if the full return from 
exploiting the patent in the hands of the subsidiary is siphoned off to the owner 
of the patent, the parent company, through a royalty payment. Licensing-out a 
patent to a low-taxed subsidiary only results in a reduction of the group’s 
effective tax burden if the royalty payment corresponds only to a fraction of the 
return from exploiting the patent.  
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By contrast, contract R&D arrangements may generally achieve a reduction of the 
group’s effective average tax burden if the contractor is reimbursed on a cost-
plus basis. According to transfer pricing rules, the cost-plus method is indeed an 
appropriate method for determining an arm’s length contract R&D fee under the 
condition that the commissioning party bears the risks and the costs of the R&D 
investment and directs and supervises the R&D activity.  
In such a setting, the allocation of functions and risks fundamentally differs from 
the case of disposals and licensing arrangements as in these cases the parent 
assumes the risk associated with the R&D investment. My findings support the 
notion that by rearranging functions and risks among the members of the group, 
multinational companies may shift profits to low-tax countries and achieve a 
reduction of their overall EATR.  
If, by contrast, the residence country of the parent company requires that the 
parent is reimbursed based on the profit-split method, the picture is 
fundamentally different and largely corresponds to the case of the disposal of 
the asset or the licensing arrangement. We demonstrate above, that applying 
the profit-split method for determining contract R&D fees significantly reduces 
the leeway for profit shifting by means of intra-group contract R&D 
arrangements. These findings are of importance given a possible move towards 
the profit split method in certain countries such as India64 or even under the 
OECD transfer pricing rules for intangible assets which are currently under 
revision.65 
Summing up, the leeway for shifting profits to low-tax subsidiaries is widest 
under contract R&D arrangements, in particular if the cost-plus method is 
applied when determining the fee for intra-group contract R&D. In contrast, 
transferring intangible assets to low-taxed subsidiaries, whether on a permanent 
                                                 
64  For details, see section 3.3.1.2.  
65  According to some commentators, the draft of chapter six of the guidelines on the transfer 
pricing rules for intangible assets encourages a broader use of the profit split method 
compared to the transfer pricing guidelines published in 2010. See Silberztein et al. (2013), 
p. 63, Sullivan (2013), p. 15. 
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or a temporary basis, only achieves a reduction of the effective tax burden if the 
value of the patent is understated thereby falling below its earnings value.  
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